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Market discipline is an article of faith among financial economists, and the use of market
discipline as a regulatory tool is gaining credibility.  Effective market discipline involves two
distinct components: security holders’ ability to accurately assess the condition of a firm
(“monitoring”) and their ability to cause subsequent managerial actions to reflect those
assessments (“influence”). Substantial evidence supports the existence of market monitoring.
However, little evidence exists on market influence, and then only for stockholders and for rare
events such as management turnover. This paper seeks evidence that U.S. bank holding
companies’ security price changes reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. Although we
identify some patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, we have not found strong
evidence that stock or (especially) bond investors regularly influence managerial actions.  Market
influence remains, for the moment, more a matter of faith than of empirical evidence.
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I. Introduction
That markets discipline firms and firms’ managers is an article of faith amongst financial
economists, with surprisingly little direct empirical support. The market discipline paradigm requires:  1)
that the necessary information is publicly available and that the private benefits to monitoring outweigh
the costs; 2) that rational investors continually gather and process information about traded firms whose
securities they hold and about the markets in which they operate; 3) that investors' assessments of firm
condition and future prospects are impounded into the firm’s equity and debt prices; and 4) that managers
operate in the security holders’ interests.  The prices of a firm’s traded securities are the most obvious
public signal by which the evaluations of stakeholder/monitors make their evaluations known to
management.
The idea that market prices provide informative signals that affect how managers run  their
companies occupies pride of place in most introductory microeconomic classes.  Likewise, finance
textbooks assert that investors lead firms toward appropriate decisions by changing security prices in
response to apparent trends and managerial policies. Only in the more advanced classes do students learn
that product market externalities or deviations from the perfect capital market assumptions can undermine
financial market discipline. Indeed, much of modern corporate finance concerns the ways in which
markets may fail to discipline firms or firm managers appropriately.
Financial regulators are concerned that the increasing complexity of large banking organizations
makes them difficult to monitor and control using traditional supervisory tools. Financial regulators have
been increasingly drawn to the idea that private investors can affect the actions of financial firms. This
interest in harnessing market disciplinary forces to assist regulatory goals reflects the growing evidence
that investors can assess a financial firms’ true condition quite well. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision’s consultative paper on capital adequacy (Basel [1999]) asserts that “[m]arket discipline
imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner,” and
designates market discipline as one of the three pillars on which future financial regulation should be
based.
1 A Federal Reserve task force has recently investigated whether requiring large banking firms to2
issue subordinated debt on a regular basis would enhance supervision.   The 1999 Banking Bill, which
overhauled banking regulation in the US, required that the larger nationally chartered banks have debt
outstanding.
The concept of "market discipline" incorporates two distinct components: investors’ ability to
evaluate a firm’s true condition, and the responsiveness of firm managers to the investor feedback
impounded in security prices.  Although the banking literature often fails to distinguish clearly between
these components, their implications for regulatory reform differ substantially. For the sake of clarity, we
define two distinct aspects of market discipline in this paper: market monitoring and market influence.
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¨  “Monitoring” refers to the hypothesis that investors accurately understand changes in a firm’s
condition and incorporate those assessments promptly into the firm’s security prices.
Monitoring generates the market signals to which managers are thought to respond.
¨  “Influence” is the process by which a security price change engenders firm (manager)
responses to counteract adverse changes in firm condition.
The market discipline paradigm is inherently asymmetric. Negative market signals indicate that investors
want management to make changes, while positive signals do not necessarily suggest that change is
desired. Regulatory discipline also focuses primarily on avoiding or reversing adverse changes in firm
condition.
Extensive evidence supports the hypothesis that markets can effectively identify a firm’s true
financial condition, at least on a contemporaneous basis.
3 Less evidence exists that investors can foresee
future changes in firms’ fortunes not already manifest in current financial statements. However, accurate
market signals are not sufficient to assure that investors can collectively influence the actions of firm
management. We have comparatively little evidence about the ability of equity or (especially) debt
owners to influence firm activities.
The finance literature provides numerous reasons to be circumspect about the ability of market
participants to influence managers: asymmetric information, costly monitoring, principal-agent problems
and conflicts of interest among stakeholders.
4  The entire optimal contracting literature is premised on the3
idea that investor/owners are disadvantaged vis-à-vis managers in monitoring firms and ensuring that the
firm is run in the investors’ interest. Furthermore, different types of claimants may evaluate managerial
actions differently. Bondholders are less interested in upside potential than in seeing that default is
avoided. Stockholders, on the other hand, may prefer a riskier investment strategy as long as the expected
return compensates them for the additional risk. Thus, the idea of “market” discipline raises the question
of “which market?”
5
Stockholders and bondholders can surely influence managers in extremis. For example, Penn
Central’s management was forced to take action when money market participants refused to roll over its
commercial paper. The firm was forced to file for Chapter 11, substantially affecting all concerned.
Stockholders can also vote out management, and poor firm performance increases the likelihood of
managerial turnover. Sufficiently disgruntled stockholders can also create an environment that facilitates
a hostile take-over. However, policy proposals for using market discipline to enhance banking supervision
usually envisage something more commonplace, constructive and benign than precipitating bankruptcy or
replacing management through takeovers.  Yet, so far, we have virtually no empirical evidence
concerning market influence in non-extreme situations.
 This paper seeks to complement the existing literature on market monitoring by looking for
direct evidence of stockholder and bondholder influence in the U.S. banking sector.  Because financial
regulators are actively considering the formal use of market discipline in their supervisory process, an
empirical investigation of market influence on bank holding companies (BHC) is quite timely.  Even
beyond the obvious policy implications, however, BHCs provide a fruitful area for examining investor
influence more generally.  First, banking firms have relatively high leverage, which makes shareholders
unusually sensitive to changes in asset value or risk.  Second, BHC deposits have absolute priority over
other financial liabilities, which should increase the urgency with which bondholders feel the results of
adverse changes in asset value or risk. Third, the Federal Reserve collects extensive financial data about
BHCs, and the industry is relatively homogeneous.  It is thus feasible to examine detailed BHC asset,
liability, and cash flow changes from one calendar quarter to the next.
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We begin by showing that stock and bond prices frequently move in opposite directions, which
presumably gives them opposing preferences about managerial action.  We then investigate whether
returns on BHC stocks and bonds appear to be associated with subsequent managerial changes to firm
characteristics. We experiment with multiple measures of market signals, a large number of managerial
“action” variables, and various lags between signal and potential action. What evidence we find of market
influence is weak and, at best, mixed. Certainly, we find no prima facie support for the hypothesis that
bondholders or stockholders consistently influence day-to-day (quarter-to-quarter) managerial actions in a
prominent manner consistent with their own interests.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses agency problems pertaining to complex
U.S. bank holding companies that generate the need for disciplinary forces.  Section III discusses the
construction of the study's data set.  Section IV presents evidence on the extent to which bondholders and
shareholders have common – as opposed to conflicting – goals in disciplining firm managers.  Section V
describes and motivates our tests for market influence, and the results of those tests are presented in
Section VI.  The last section concludes and discusses the regulatory implications of our findings.
II. Agency Problems and the Rationale for Stakeholder Influence
The governance problem in a levered firm generally involves three groups: shareholders,
bondholders and (unless the managers also own the firm) managers.  Beginning with Jensen and
Meckling [1976], financial economists have studied the problems shareholders have inducing managers to
act in the owners' best interests.  The literature on executive compensation evaluates the "carrot" approach
to managerial control, investigating how managers can be given incentives to perform appropriately
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988], Kaplan [1994], Hubbard and Palia [1995], Hadlock and Lummer
[1997]).  Other writers consider the ‘stick’ provided by board oversight. Mikkelson and Partch [1997],
Martin and McConnell [1991], Denis and Denis [1995], and Canella, Fraser, and Lee [1995] studied
managerial turnover. Brickley and James [1987], Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner [1997], and Hirschleifer5
and Thakor [1998] studied the impact of board composition on shareholder returns. DeYoung et al.
[1999] and Ang, Cole, and Lin [2000] studied the influence of large shareholders on banking efficiency.
Whereas shareholders’ ability to affect managerial actions has been studied previously, we have
located no previous research into the ability of bondholders to influence managers. The primary agency
problem in a investor owned corporation involves executive performance. If that performance affects firm
value, then bondholders and stockholders may both wish to monitor managerial slacking and perquisite
consumption.  An increase in a firm's asset value raises both share and (weakly) debt prices.
7 Ceteris
paribus, bondholders and stockholders share an interest in the firm's continued profitability.  But ceteris
rarely is paribus and the rub comes in the risk associated with the increase in firm value. Here bondholder
and stockholder interests strongly diverge. Greater asset risk or financial leverage, for example, may raise
the value of stockholders' option-like claim on the firm’s residual cash flows. Stockholders benefit from
risk as long as it is associated with a sufficiently high rate of expected return. However, an unanticipated
increase in risk generally reduces the value of fixed-income claims. Bond covenants are designed to limit
a firm's ability to shift risk by giving bondholders some control rights under some circumstances.
Stockholders accept such covenants because they can increase overall firm value (Smith and Warner
[1979], Myers [1977]).
The incentives of managers, beyond consuming perquisites, are ambiguous.  If managers’
incentives are well aligned with those of shareholders (e.g. through performance-based compensation),
their actions may tend to harm bondholders.  If managers receive insufficient pay-for-performance,
managerial claims on the firm resemble bonds more closely than equity, and managers may reduce equity
values by acting too conservatively.
III. Sample Selection and Data Sources
We assembled our BHC sample by forming the intersection of three data sets: the Y-9 Reports
(Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, available on the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago website), the CRSP Stock Returns and Master Files, and the Warga/Lehman Brothers6
Corporate Bond Data Base (Warga [1995]). Our sample period began in 1986, prior to which the Y-9
Reports lacked sufficient detail, and continued through December 1997. We did not require that a firm
exist for the entire period, but used whatever data were available for each BHC. A total of 107 BHCs
were simultaneously listed in all three data sources for at least part of the 1986-1988 period.
The Y-9 Reports provide information on BHC balance sheets and income statements. Although
specific Y-9 variable definitions changed over time, we could combine data series to construct variables
with reasonably consistent definitions throughout the sample period.
Stock returns, dividends, prices and shares outstanding were obtained from the CRSP monthly
stock files. We computed quarterly returns and two measures of excess returns. The simple excess return
is the difference between the stock return and the contemporaneous stock market index returns (the CRSP
value weighted index of all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). We also computed
market model excess returns using a 60-month moving window to estimate the market model parameters.
The resulting parameters were used to compute the next month’s market model excess return. The process
was repeated for each month, rolling forward the estimation window and forecast period.  Our results are
robust to the definition of excess returns used.  The simple excess return provides the greatest number of
usable observations of the two excess return measures as it requires no prior history of stock returns to
compute the market model parameters.  We therefore present results for raw returns and simple excess
returns when analyzing the interaction between stocks and bonds in Section IV, and only simple excess
returns when analyzing evidence of market influence in Section VI.
  BHC bond information, taken from the Warga/Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Database,
includes monthly credit rating, yield, price, accrued interest and face value outstanding.  The 107 bank
holding companies had a total of 761 bonds outstanding for at least some part of the sample period.
Quarter-to-quarter changes in yields and quarterly returns were computed in a straightforward manner.
Unlike equities, the literature provides little guidance for constructing benchmarks to measure
excess bond performance. We constructed multiple indices to ensure robustness of our reported results.
Within indices, bonds were assigned to buckets containing bonds of similar term-to-maturity and ratings7
(using Moody and S&P ratings to produce two sets of indices).  Ratings were grouped into 11 categories
that corresponded to Moody and S&P ratings, suppressing the ‘+’ or ‘–‘ qualifiers attached to the basic
rating definitions. Three term-to-maturity categories were used: 0–5 year; 5–10 years and greater than 10
years. Two alternative bond populations were used to form indices. “All Firms” indices were constructed
using all domestic industrial, utility, transportation and financial industry bonds in the Warga Database
(thus excluding government, agency, mortgage-backed, sovereign and foreign bonds). The “All
Financials” indices were constructed using only bonds of corporations classified as financial institutions
in the Warga database. Both the “All Firms” and “All Financials” indices included the bank holding
company bonds used in this study. For each rating/term classification bucket, index yields, yield changes
and returns were constructed using both equal and value weighting as measured by face value of amounts
outstanding at the end of the previous quarter. The result was 8 indices—each containing 33 yield, yield
change and return series—against which to measure excess bond performance.
Each bank holding company has a single common stock issue outstanding (we restricted our
analysis to common stock—those with CUSIPs ending in ‘10’), but may have multiple bonds outstanding
at any given time. For bank holding companies with multiple bonds outstanding in a given quarter, we
constructed BHC-wide bond measures by aggregating the raw and excess bond performance measures
across outstanding bonds within each bank holding company each quarter.
8 Aggregation was done using
both arithmetic and principal-weighted averages of each performance measure. For each BHC/quarter we
thus have two sets of raw yields, yield changes and returns, and 16 sets of yield, yield change and return
spreads over various indices.
There is no obviously appropriate manner for aggregating and comparing yields of bonds of
differing maturities. We have evaluated a variety of index construction methods, and our results are
robust across methods.  Therefore, we present results only for raw bond returns and excess returns
measured against the principal-weighted, "All Firms" bonds index. BHCs with multiple bonds are
assigned returns for a principal-weighted average of their individual bond returns and excess returns.
Hereafter, in referring to “bonds” we will mean these within-BHC-aggregated measures. The final data8
set includes stock and bond returns and contemporaneous accounting information for 2,490 firm-quarters
over the period June 1986 – March 1998.
IV. The Correlation between Bond and Stock Returns
As we pointed out in Section II, the potential divergence of stock and bondholders’ preferences
affects the search for evidence of market influence.  Previous studies presenting evidence on the co-
movements of stock and bond returns include Kwan [1996] for all industrial firms and Ellis and Flannery
[1992] for bank equity and CD rates.  In both studies, the evidence suggests that changes in the typical
firm’s value affect expected asset payoffs, and not the assets’ return volatility.  Accordingly, a firm's
stock and bond returns tend to be positively correlated.  In this situation, the influence of bondholders
may be difficult to separate from the influence of shareholders, since both groups tend to evaluate new
developments similarly. Requiring banks to issue subordinated debentures might then be pointless,
because bondholders’ assessments   and influence would simply replicate those of shareholders. We
therefore begin by evaluating whether bond and shareholder preferences are sufficiently different to
permit us to identify separate bondholder and stockholder influences on bank managers.
Table 1 reports the Pearson correlations and rank order correlations for stock and bond returns
and excess returns. Given the leptokurtic distribution of returns, the rank correlations provide a robust
confirmation of the Pearson correlation measures. For both stocks and bonds, Table 1 indicates a strong
positive correlation between raw and excess returns for each security type.  The excess stock and bond
returns are much less strongly correlated with each other than the raw returns are. Nonetheless, both the
Pearson and the rank-order correlations are all significantly positive  (a = .05).  Other stock and bond
excess return measures yield results similar to those shown in Table 1.
Our empirical work concentrates on the interaction of stock and bond returns, which we measure
in two ways.  First, we simply classify each return as either positive or negative.  Tables 2a and 2b report
counts of positive and negative security raw returns and excess returns.  In both panels, a Chi-squared test9
rejected (with p-values of 0.001) the hypothesis that stock and bond return classifications were
independent.
9 This confirms the evidence from the correlations reported in Table 1. Raw stock and bond
prices move in the same direction nearly two-thirds of the time, consistent with security returns
responding to changes in the firm’s overall value.  In the upper left cell of this table, where all investors
lose money, we would expect influence to be most readily apparent.  By contrast, the impact on firm
claimants derived from (advertent or inadvertent) changes in the firm’s leverage or asset volatility is
evidenced by stock and bond returns moving in opposite directions (upper right and lower left cells).  In
these instances, stockholder and bondholder signals conflict and we maybe able to identify which group,
if either, influences firm managers more strongly.
A Chi-square test rejects independence of both the two securities’ returns and excess returns.
Table 2b clearly indicates that stock and bond excess return signs are less likely to coincide than the raw
return signs are.  Nevertheless, contradictory stock and bond return signals are common:  35% of firm-
quarters have stock and bond raw returns moving in opposite directions while 45% of the firm-quarters
have excess returns moving in opposite directions.
Categorizing security returns as simply positive or negative fails to distinguish small from large
value changes.  Some of our empirical work therefore employs the three-part return taxonomy illustrated
in Tables 2c and 2d.  Each stock and bond return was assigned to one of three equal-sized groups: “Up”,
“Flat” and “Down.”  We would expect to see the strongest evidence of market influence when the signals
are large and reinforcing, in the “Up, Up” and “Down, Down” cells. Conversely, strong but contradictory
signals should provide the weakest evidence of discipline  (“Up, Down” and “Down, Up”).  Stockholder-
only influence will be reflected in particularly strong responses to cells along the top row, while
bondholder-only influence should manifest itself in the leftmost column.
Chi-squared statistics again reject the hypothesis that the raw and excess stock and bond returns
are independent in Tables 2c and 2d..  Contradictory stock and bond signals are common, with strong
contradictory signals (“Up, Down” or “Down, Up”) occurring about 14% of the time for raw returns and
19% of the time for excess returns.10
Figures 1a and 1b present the proportion of firm-quarters falling into each of the four binary
categories each year.
10 These figures show wide variation in the distribution of stock and bond return





u) would both be zero. This clearly is not the case: a Chi-squared test fails to reject the
hypothesis that bond and stock values move independently of one another in 6 of the 12 sample years for
the raw returns in Figure 1a (a = 0.05). Although the excess returns are more uniformly distributed, Chi-
squared tests still fail to reject the independence of stock and bond returns in 4 of 12 sample years.
To summarize, a typical BHC’s stock and bond returns are moderately positively correlated
overall, however this varies substantially across individual years in the sample.  The sample includes a
sufficiently diverse set of price of signals to isolate stock market and bond market effects, if there be any,
and to determine if one source of discipline dominates the other, or whether they reinforce one another.
V. Methodology for Detecting Stock and Bond Market Influences
In order to detect market influence we look for an effect of stock and bond returns on managerial
actions.  We first illustrate our methodology with a simplified version of the regressions we actually run.
An extensive discussion of this simplified model in Section V.1 indicates which inferences can (or
cannot) be drawn about market influence. We describe how we implement the basic model estimation in
Section V.2.
V.1. Identifying Influence
We begin with a working definition of market influence:
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Consider a very simple firm, whose value is impacted by a single exogenous variable (Xt) and an
endogenous variable ( t A ) controlled by the manager. The firm has a single security, a stock, whose price
Market influence obtains when the return on the firm’s securities impacts expected
managerial actions, and those actions in turn affect security value.11
reflects the firm’s expected future value. At time t-1 the stockholder observes the exogenous shock, forms
an expectation of the action the manager will take in response and adjusts the stock price.  The net effect
of all these changes is the stock’s quarterly return, 1. t R -  The manager’s expected action at time t depends
on past stock returns Rt-1 and/or on Xt-1:
() 11 1 (, ) . tt A tt EA f RX -- - =
We linearize this relationship and estimate
10 1 1 2 1 () , tt t t EA aa R a X -- - =+ +
which provides an expected managerial action conditional on information available at t-1. At time t the
manager’s action is observed.
12 If the stockholder is rational, the unexpected component of that action,
() 1 , tttt AE A e - =-  will be mean zero and uncorrelated with the information available at time t-1.
13
These conditions are obtained by estimating
01 12 1 tt t t Aaa R a X e -- =+ + + (1)
using OLS.
At time t another exogenous shock  t X  occurs and the manager takes his action. This action may
depend in part on  t X .
14 Stockholders then update their estimate of firm value based on,  t X  and the
surprise component of the manager’s action . t e  We (again) model this relation as linear:
() 01 1 2
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(2)
After estimating these models, we evaluate 
1 ˆ a  and  1 ˆ b  to identify evidence consistent with market
influence on BHC managers. As we have defined market influence, both 
1 ˆ a  and  1 ˆ b  should be
significantly different from zero: lagged returns help predict managerial actions, and security values in
turn respond when those actions are actually taken.12
Outcomes with 
1 ˆ 0 a =  are consistent with absence of influence. They may also be consistent
with the managers acting to exactly offset all shocks, and stockholders being aware the manager will do
so. While we cannot totally reject this possibility such managerial perfection does seem remote, and the
‘sanguine stockholder” is inconsistent with the strong relation we see between stock (and bond) returns
and the variables we use to proxy for exogenous shocks.
Turning now to the response regression (2),  1 ˆ 0 b =  indicates that the action surprise does not
appear to affect investor beliefs about firm value.  One possibility is that we have chosen inappropriate
measures of managerial action.  (Investors simply do not care about changes in our measured actions.)
Another possibility is that our specification is appropriate, but the tests lack power.  Finally, investors
may predict perfectly what actions managers will take, even though our model fails to do so, and hence
we find no return associated with the actions themselves.  This latter possibility strains credulity. When
1 ˆ 0 a ¹  and  1 ˆ 0 b =  we have the appearance of the stockholder influencing an action he does not appear to
care about. Alternative, and perhaps more sensible, interpretations are that our tests lacked power to reject
1 ˆ 0, b =  or that the stock return  1 t R -  is proxying for an unobserved omitted variable. Unfortunately, this
last (unsatisfying) outcome is the most common one in our results.
Investor influence could be either beneficial or perverse.  Beneficial influence is what advocates
of market discipline have in mind. While perverse influence (when managers take actions opposite to
what the stakeholder wishes) may reflect unresolved agency problems. Modifying the influence equation
(1) makes it possible to discriminate between these two types of influence.
The  1 b  coefficient reveals the preferred direction of managerial action. If   1 0, b >  then a positive
action surprise at time t is associated with a positive return at time t. Assuming that the time t exogenous
shock has not reversed the desired direction of action, the time t-1 desired action would also be positive.
The contribution of the time t-1 return to the expected action is  11 . t aR-  The sign of  11 t aR-  depends on the
sign of  1. t R -   1 t R -  is roughly as likely to be positive as it is to be negative, so the sign of  11 t aR-  is13
indeterminate. The sign of  1 a  is thus insufficient for us to determine whether a significant value for  1 a  is
evidence of beneficial or perverse influence.
However, if we partition  1 t R -  into two variables,  1 t R
+
-  and 1 t R
-
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and change equation (1) to
11 01 1 2 1 tt tt t Aaa R a R a X e
--
++ --
- = ++++ . (1a)
we can then determine whether influence is beneficial or perverse. Suppose again that  1 0 b > , meaning
that investors prefer more of the associated action to less.  Then 
1 0 a
+ >  and 
1 0 a
- >  would both be
consistent with beneficial investor influence, i.e. the security holder influencing the expected managerial
action in the desired positive direction—
1 1 t aR
-
++  and 
1 1 t aR
-





- <  would imply that the effect of returns on the expected managerial action is the opposite of
that desired by the security holder. Similar reasoning applies to the case of  1 0. b <  Table 3 summarizes
the interpretation of influence regressions in terms of beneficial or perverse influence.
 Equations (1a) and (2) lay out the basic idea for detecting observable market influence and
discriminating between the beneficial influence we expect if markets work properly and the perverse
influence that may obtain if frictions are present. To apply this methodology to actual data requires a
considerable increase in complexity, although the core ideas remain unchanged.14
V.2. Implementation
Estimating the regression model (1a) and (2) requires explicit selection of security returns, action
variables under close managerial control, and a set of balance sheet variables not (completely) under
managerial control that proxy for the exogenous shocks to BHC value.  We have also included a set of
control variables to proxy for changes in the economic environment.
It is usual to think that security returns have a systematic component that reflects exogenous
shocks to the economy, and an idiosyncratic component that reflects firm-specific factors including
managerial actions. The systematic component of returns is outside the scope of the security holders’ (i.e.
market) influence on individual firm’s manager’s actions. We therefore measure each BHC’s stock and
bond returns as the excess return, over appropriate market return indices.
15 We denote these excess returns
stk
t R and 
bnd
t R  respectively. Firm excess returns reflect (actual and anticipated) managerial actions, plus
idiosyncratic exogenous shocks.
16  Since our interest lies with managerial influence, we will need to
control for the latter.
V.2.a. The Influence Equation
We are interested in two sets of investors; stockholders and bondholders. The corporate
governance literature focuses primarily on stockholder/management issues. However, the discussion of
market discipline as a component of bank regulation focuses on debt. Bondholders and regulators
confront similar risk/return tradeoffs: they do not share in the upside return to risky projects, but are
exposed to loss if the projects fail. We must take account of both groups’ preferences in evaluating
whether investors can reliably influence managers.  Moreover, because stock and bondholders are often
affected differently by managerial actions, we must interact both sets of preferences in order to  account
for potentially-offsetting influence coming from the two groups.  Furthermore, we conjecture that positive
market signals may elicit less reaction from managers than do negative signals.  (Why change a winning15
strategy?)  While an across-the-board rise in equity and bond values appears to require no managerial
changes, an across-the-board decline might elicit the most intense adjustments.
Our illustrative specification of the influence equation (1a) indicates that past returns may affect
managers, but theory provides no indication of the appropriate lag between signal and action.  How long
should it take a market signal to influence managers?   We wished to let the data describe the delays
associated with market influence, while preserving a reasonable number of degrees of freedom for our
estimates.  Accordingly, we include three lags of the market signals in our regressions, and three lags of
the exogenous shock variables. We also investigated single-lag models, in which the explanatory
variables were lagged 1, 2 or 3 quarters, and these produced qualitatively similar results (not reported).
The specifications we employ permit shareholders and bondholders to have differential influence and for
the influence to differ for between ‘up’ and ‘down’ return signals.
In our first implementation of equation (1a) we classify excess stock and bond returns as either
positive or negative, and interact the resulting four dummy variables with the absolute value of each
security’s return.  For each possible action variables, we estimate:
() () () ()
() () () ()
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where  Ait  is one of the action variables available to BHC i’s managers during quarter t;
k (k < 3) is the lag length, in quarters, between market signal (return) and managerial action;
()
u u
t i B S I ,  is a dummy variable equal to one for a quarter for which when BHC i's stock return
(S) was “up” and its bond return (B) was “up:”  The variables  () ,
mn
it IS B  are defined
analogously, where m, n = “u” indicates  that the security’s value went up, and  m, n = d
indicates that the security’s value fell down.
bnd
k t , i R -  is the absolute value of the i
th BHC’s bond return over period t-k;16
stk
k t , i R -  is the absolute value of the i
th BHC’s stock return over period t-k;
1 - t X  is a vector of exogenous shock variables; and
1 t- D  is a vector of dummy (control) variables indicating the years.
The specification (3a) captures the BHC’s stock and bond returns’ interaction, and the magnitude




t i R B S I ,  (for example) measure the impact of
a negative stock return accompanied by a decline in bond value.  (This combination of stock-bond




t i R B S I ,
would indicate the effect of a negative bond return under the same circumstances.  Finding that the R
stk-
related coefficient is significant and of the appropriate sign while the R
bnd-related coefficient is not
significant would suggest that managers are more responsive to shareholders’ welfare than to
bondholders’.  Of the eight potential combinations of absolute excess returns with direction of movement









t i R B S I ,  are both significant and signed to suggest influence. This combination of directional
dummies suggests that a decrease in stock price is influential, regardless of the direction of bond price
movement. However, it is difficult to understand why the influence of a stock decline should be
proportional to the magnitude of the bond excess return!
The specification (3a) requires that managerial actions be proportional to preceding realized
returns.  However, we noted above that a security return reflects in part the anticipated managerial
response.  Relying on measures of the absolute returns in (3a) requires that the scale or probability of
managerial action be proportional to a return that reflects, in part, the investors’ expected managerial
actions.  To assess whether our results depend on this implied restriction, we repeated the analysis using a
three-way classification scheme for returns (as in Tables 2c and 2d):17
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where Ait and Xt are defined as in (3a) and the dummy variables
()
b a
t i B S J ,  takes the value 1 if the excess stock return (S) is ‘a’ and the excess bond return (B) is
‘b.’ The superscripts ‘a’ and ‘b’ can take on one of three values:
u = an “up” return, ranking in the upper third of excess returns on like securities in the
sample,
f = a "flat" return, ranking in the middle third of excess returns on like securities, and
d = a “down” return, in the lowest third of excess returns for like securities.
Regression (3b) permits managers to respond to eight types of market signal, corresponding to the outside
cells of Tables 2c and 2d.  These measures of stock and bond returns permit us to incorporate some
information about return magnitudes, while still reaping the econometric advantages of categorical
variables when the importance of return magnitudes is uncertain. . Note that we retain a constant term in
equation (3b) while omitting the least interesting case (S 
fB 
f) from the specification.
V.2.b. The “Response” Equation
The response equation (2) is estimated separately for stock and bond excess returns. Instead of a
single action surprise driving the excess return, we now specify that period t security returns
depend on a complete set of ‘n’ action surprises
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The observed managerial actions ( t , i A ) can be combined with the influence regression (3a or 3b) to
compute the surprise component of each action.  The sign of bi or bi* immediately implies the
stakeholders’ preferred managerial action. We can thus determine whether, on average over the entire
sample, an unexpected dividend cut (e.g.) is viewed as valuable to bondholders. The exogenous shock
variables Xt contain the lagged shock variables Xt-1, as well the contemporaneous (time t) exogenous
shock variables.
V.2.c. The Set of Managerial Actions
We have implicitly assumed that managers can effectively control the “actions” that investors are
trying to effect.  Finding measurable variables with this characteristic presents something of a challenge.
Suppose, for example, that BHC share prices fall in response to large loan losses.  The firm’s leverage
therefore rises and bondholders would like managers to reduce leverage back toward its ex ante level.
(The shareholders’ preference is less clear.)  In testing for stockholder and bondholder influence, one
might be tempted to designate book leverage as a managerial action variable. Managers do not entirely
control book leverage. Managers might set out to reduce leverage by tightening credit requirements for
new borrowers. If loan demand conforms to the managers’ expectations, these policies should indeed
reduce BHC leverage.  Because loan demand is not perfectly controllable or predictable, however,
leverage might still increase despite management’s sincere efforts to reduce it.  For example, customers
with pre-negotiated lines of credit might draw down surprisingly large proportions of their credit lines.
Leverage is thus an ambiguous indicator of managerial action.  The sale of new stock or a dividend cut
might be more appropriate managerial action variables, because managers unambiguously control
dividends and stock issues. Table 4 presents our measures of managerial action.  We divide these actions
into three sub-groups: those affecting leverage, those affecting asset portfolio risk, and “others.”  For
some action variables we also include a binary classification (e.g. dividends up vs. not up) along with the
continuous measures.
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It is difficult to establish that a particular set of action measures is complete. Some legitimate
action measures may be omitted, and managers may only imperfectly control others that are included.
Our approach is to seek systematic linkages in the data that appear to be consistent with managers taking
responsive actions in the wake of security losses or gains. By considering a number of regression
specifications and various ways of measuring the key variables, we hope to determine if the
preponderance of the evidence supports the market influence hypothesis.
V.2.d. Exogenous Shock Variables
In a dynamic firm, managerial action variables may vary through time for reasons other than the
immediate desires of stock or bondholders. In order to isolate the effect of past security returns on
managerial actions, therefore, we must control for these exogenous factors. We utilize an agnostic
statistical approach to absorb predetermined variation in action variables, regressing changes in each
action variable against a large set of control variables, intended to capture any path dependence in
managers’ decisions.  Importantly, these exogenous shock variables do not include past stock and or bond
returns.  Table 5 lists the income and balance sheet variables we include to model predetermined changes
in the action variables. We also include in the set of exogenous variables:
1)  Year dummy variables, to control for omitted variations in the banking industry’s condition,
ease of access to stock and bond markets, regulatory pressures, and so forth.
2)  In the influence equation (1): recent quarterly changes in the (dependent) decision variable.
3)  In the response equation (2): one quarterly lag of the dependent variable (a stock or bond
return).
Note that the lagged BHC ratios in (3a or 3b) may be correlated with the lagged security returns.
We include both sets of explanatory variables in the regression, thereby permitting the data to apportion20
explanatory power between the lagged returns and lagged control variables. As one indicator of the
importance of market influence, we will report the marginal contribution to 
2
R  for the accounting
variables (given the lagged returns), and vice versa.
VI. Empirical Results
We now present estimation results for the influence and response regressions, (3a-3b) and (4a-
4b).  We first consider the estimated coefficients’ parametric statistical significance, in the context of
Table 3 and the discussion in Section V.2. This approach is conservative, and yields little evidence of
beneficial investor influence.  We then apply a sign-based analysis that ignores parametric statistical
significance and looks for patterns consistent with the beneficial and perverse influence hypotheses.  We
find some extreme cases, where the signs of all coefficients are consistent with one hypothesis or the
other, for which we can reject the null hypothesis of ‘no influence.’  However, in most cases the signs are
not all consistent, and we can only note the tendency one way or the other in the data.
VI.1. Analysis of Influence Regressions
We identify significant influence coefficients (the analogs of a1 in equation (1)) on the basis of
the sum of the three lagged coefficients for each action variable.  Table 6a presents these sums and their
corresponding statistical significance for the influence specification (3a), and Table 6b presents the results
for specification (3b).  The ‘H0: All 8 sums = 0’ rows provide the formal test of the ‘no influence’ null
hypothesis. In both specifications the null is rejected for 12 of 18 action variables at the 10% level.
Applying a 5% confidence level, we reject the null for 11 action variables in Table 6a and 9 action
variables using the alternative specification of Table 6b.
The two influence specifications exhibit a good deal of similarity in the actions they identify as
responding to lagged returns. Both specifications reject the “no influence” hypothesis for half of our
continuous action variables (CMINCR, EQINCR, dCDIVP, TAGROW) and four of the five binary action21
variables (DCOMUP, DPFUP, DEQUP, DSND).  Several variables (dSHCRSP, dQSUBDB, dSECPCT)
carry jointly insignificant coefficient sums (10% level) in both tables.  PFINCR also looks quite weak in
both specifications. Overall, the frequencies with which we reject the ‘no influence’ null hypothesis in
Table 6a and Table 6b strongly suggest more than simple sampling variation.  These results are consistent
with investors exerting some influence over BHC managers.
Moreover, many of the individually significant summed return coefficient combinations are
economically sensible.  We expect influence to be weakest for 
uu SBcombinations and strongest for
dd SB combinations.  The coefficient estimates reflect this general pattern, although not overwhelmingly:
Table 6a exhibits 9 significant coefficients (10% level) for the 
dd SB combinations, against 5 for 
uu SB.
Table 6b exhibits 8 significant 
dd SB coefficients against 5 for 
uu SB.
The R
2 statistics for the full influence model and with subsets of explanatory variables omitted,
provide further, though informal, information on the degree to which returns contribute to subsequent
actions. R
2 statistics indicate that the full model explains a large fraction of the observed variation in most
of the action variables. Dropping the lagged return variables from the RHS reduces the explanatory power
of the model only marginally. So does dropping the exogenous shocks. This is consistent with our
(unreported) evidence that excess returns are predictable from the exogenous shocks.  A significant
fraction of the explanatory power of these regressions comes from the lagged dependent variables. Thus
while the coefficients on the returns in the influence equation are sometimes significant, the returns are
not providing a great deal of information beyond that contributed by other independent variables.
The observed rates of rejection of the ‘no influence’ null in Tables 6a and 6b are inconsistent with
simple sampling variation.  The fact that managerial actions follow past return patterns is  consistent with
influence, but we must look at the response equations to determine if this apparent influence is associated
with actions that actually enhance security values.22
VI.2. Parametric Evidence about Influence
Tables 7a and 7b combine new information about the estimated response equations with the
influence equation coefficient estimates already presented in Tables 6a and 6b.  The influence hypothesis
is not strongly supported by the response regression coefficients. Stock excess returns respond
significantly to only 3 (4) action variable surprises in Table 7a (7b), but the only significantly valuable
actions that appear in both specifications are dUNINTA and DCDIVUP.  (Even then, the significant,
opposite signs on the similar variables dUININS and dUNINTA in Table 7b seem puzzling.)  One of the
three significant response variables in Table 7a (dSECPCT) is not associated with significant influence.
Table 7b provides only two additional actions (dCDIVP and dUININS) that are affected by past returns
and, in turn, significantly affect excess stock returns when action is taken.
The bonds’ response regressions exhibit even fewer significant effects.  The only action surprises
with significant return response coefficients are dSECPCT in Table 7a, and dFTEMP in Table 7b; both
only weakly significant.
Investor influence requires  1 0 a ¹  and  1 0. b ¹  The dearth of significant return responses (b1)
therefore leaves us with scant evidence in favor of influence.  In Table 7a the significant stock and bond
response coefficients for dSECPCT are not associated with any significant influence coefficients. The
significant coefficient on stock response to dUNINTA is associated with a significant influence variable,
on the 
dd SB combination and the signs are consistent with beneficial influence. Unhappily, this picture
is spoilt by the fact that the significant stock response is associated with a significant bond influence.
Table 7b is not much more encouraging. The significant stock response coefficient for dCDIVP is
associated with two weak influences associated with stock down states, consistent with influence.
However, the signs of the coefficients are consistent with perverse, rather than beneficial, influence. The
weakly significant bond response coefficient on dFTEMP is associated with a weakly significant
influence coefficient on the action for  ,
ud SB consistent with influence, although again perverse rather
than beneficial. The significant dUININS stock response coefficient is associated with three significant23
influence variables. In this case the signs are consistent with beneficial influence, but the three return
states that appear to be influencing the dUININS action variable are all bond down states. This seems
inconsistent with stocks influencing actions. The significant dUNINTA stock response is associated with
bond-down-related influence coefficients and the signs are consistent with perverse influence. Finally, in
both tables the significant stock response on the DCDIVUP action variable is associated with several
influences; again predominantly of bond-down and of signs consistent with perverse influence.
In summary, while there appears to be significant association between return variables and
subsequent managerial actions, the evidence of influence from combining the influence and response
regression results is very weak, and in no case is there clear evidence of beneficial influence. As was
pointed out earlier, this is not conclusive evidence against stock and bondholder influence, but neither is it
evidence for influence. That the few instance of influence that we can detect are consistent with perverse,
rather than beneficial influence is not promising.
VI.3. Non-Parametric Evidence about Influence
The broadly insignificant results for the response regressions might reflect a general power failure
for the parametric tests applied in the usual sort of regression analysis.  We therefore evaluate whether a
simple, non-parametric signs test can provide consistent interpretations of the results in Tables 7a and 7b.
To conserve space we discuss only the tertiary specification results in Table 7b. The results in Table 7a
are similar.
The influence equation specification in Table 7b includes six explanatory variables that can
reasonably be associated with stock return influence on managerial actions,  ,,,,
uu u f ud du SB SB SB SB
,
df dd SB SB (stock flat combinations are unlikely to be associated with stock influence), and another six
for bond influence,  ,,,,,
uu f u du ud f d dd SB SB SB SB SB SB.  The probability of six coefficients
carrying the same sign by chance alone is approximately 1.6%.  Five out of six coefficients bearing the
same sign would appear by chance 18.8% of the time. A non-parametric sign test of beneficial or perverse24
influence would reject the no-influence null at the 5% level if all 6 stock influence coefficients are the
same sign as the stock response coefficient (beneficial) or the opposite sign (perverse). Where fewer than
6 relevant influence coefficients have the same sign, the influence coefficient signs may suggest a relation
one way or the other (if not half positive and half negative) but these results are statistically inconclusive.
Taking Table 7b CMINCR as an example, the stock response coefficient is positive, so beneficial
influence requires positive coefficients on the three stock-up and three stock-down influence coefficients.
Four of the relevant influence coefficients are positive ( ,,,
uu ud d f dd SB SB SB SB) and 2 are negative
( ,
uf du SB SB). This is suggestive of beneficial influence, but not significant. A single ‘B’ in the stock
column of the ‘Beneficial/perverse influence’ results column denotes this. The dUNINTA results provide
clear, significant evidence of beneficial stock influence — denoted ‘BB’ in the stock ‘Beneficial/perverse
influence’ results column—as well as significant perverse bond influence—denoted ‘PP’ in the bond
column. Table 7a can only provide weak evidence of influence. For stocks there are only 4 relevant
influence coefficients, those associated with the absolute value of the stock return. The chance of all four
coefficients having the same sign is 6.3 percent. Even though this is significant at only the 10% level, we
also denote this outcome with ‘BB’ or ‘PP’, if appropriate, in Table 7a.
These non-parametric sign tests of beneficial and perverse influence produce mixed results. Over
both specifications we find 8 (of 36) significant cases of beneficial stock influence, and 4 significant cases
of perverse stock influence. The ‘suggestive’ stock results break down 7 beneficial to 10 perverse. Less
rigorously, some indication (significant or otherwise) of beneficial stock influence obtains in 15 cases
versus 14 cases for perverse influence, with 7 cases being completely neutral. The corresponding bond
results are: 8 cases of significant beneficial bond influence; 7 cases of significant perverse bond influence;
15 cases at least suggestive of beneficial bond influence; 16 cases at least suggestive of perverse
influence, and 5 cases completely neutral.  Once again, the only strong conclusion we can draw from
these results is that the data are not uniformly consistent with the presence of beneficial investor
discipline for sample banking firms.25
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The concept of "market discipline" has attained great popularity in discussions of regulatory
reform, both in the United States and abroad.  “Market discipline” implies two quite distinct notions,
which we have tried to separate:  private investors' ability to understand ("monitor") a financial firm's true
condition, and their ability to "influence" managerial actions in appropriate ways.  A large body of
evidence suggests that markets monitor financial firms effectively and promptly, but specific tests of
investor influence have been much more limited.   Previous research provides some information about
shareholders' ability to influence firm managers, particularly in extreme situations, but empirical evidence
about bondholders' ability to influence firm behavior has been lacking.
In order to assess whether bondholders can effectively influence banking firms, we assembled
information about large U.S. bank holding companies' stock and bond returns, and their financial
condition, for the period 1986-1997.  We explicitly modeled the interaction between investors and
managers, and showed how beneficial influence should be manifested in the data.  Our methodology
should identify appropriate managerial responses to observable, exogenous events that affect BHC value.
Some types of beneficial influence will be undetectable: for example, if managers refrain from taking
actions that they know would elicit investor chagrin.  Accordingly, we note that our methodology
probably identifies a lower bound on the extent of beneficial investor influence.
The empirical results fall into two categories.  First, the standard parametric tests provided very
little evidence for investor influence.   Despite many statistically significant associations between returns
and subsequent managerial actions, we could not interpret the overall coefficient estimates as supporting
beneficial influence.  The weakness in the parametric tests derives from the paucity of meaningful return
responses to our managerial action variables.  The parametric evidence is not inconsistent with influence.
It is simply inconclusive.
A less rigorous, non-parametric interpretation of the regression results identifies evidence
consistent with both beneficial and perverse influence.  For bondholders, the instances of beneficial and
perverse influence are equal in number.   Stockholders appear to exert significant beneficial influence26
about twice as often as they exert perverse influence, consistent with the fact that equity has much more
extensive control rights in normal circumstances.   However one chooses to interpret these non-parametric
results, the evidence cannot be said to unambiguously support the presence of beneficial investor
influence on BHC firms over the sample period.
If these conclusions withstand further analysis, the implications for regulatory reliance on market
forces are important, but simple.  Other research indicates that private investors monitor financial firms
and may even anticipate changes in their financial condition. Our results do not address this question and
so carry no implication for proposals to more formally incorporated market signals into the government
supervisory process. However, in the absence of specific evidence that BHC stock and bondholders can
effectively influence managerial actions under normal operating conditions, supervisors would be unwise
to rely on investors—including subordinated debenture holders—to constrain BHC risk-taking. At least
under current institutional arrangements, supervisors must retain the responsibility for influencing
managerial actions.27
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Table 1: Stock and bond return correlations
Table 1a: Pearson correlations
Stock Returns Bond Returns
Raw Excess Raw Excess
Raw 1.00 Stock
Returns Excess 0.652 1.00
Raw 0.310 0.212 1.00 Bond
Returns Excess 0.238 0.179 0.815 1.00
Table 1b: Rank correlations
Stock Returns Bond Returns
Raw Excess Raw Excess
Raw 1.00 Stock
Returns Excess 0.848 1.00
Raw 0.271 0.189 1.00 Bond
Returns Excess 0.157 0.129 0.449 1.00
·  Raw stock returns are quarterly, inclusive of dividends.
·  Raw bond returns are quarterly, inclusive of accrued interest.
·  Excess stock returns are the difference between the stock return and the CRSP value-weighted
combined NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ market index.
·  Excess bond returns are the bond return relative to the rating/term-matched bucket in the value
weighted all bonds S&P-based index.31
Table 2: Coincidence of stock and bond returns’ directional movements






























































Table 2c: Raw returns tertiary breakdown
Bond Returns Stock Returns







































Table 2d: Excess returns tertiary breakdown
Bond Returns Stock Returns







































Table 3: Interpretation of influence as ‘beneficial’ or ‘perverse’
11 01 1 2 1 Influence Regression               
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Table 4
Action variables used to measure managerial responses to market signals
Variable
Name Variable Description
“Factors affecting BHC leverage (continuous variables)”
CMINCR Increase in value of common stock, as percentage of book value of equity.
PFINCR Increase in value of preferred stock, as percentage of book value of equity.
EQINCR Increase in equity, as percentage of book value of equity
(sum of CMINCR and CFINCR).
dSHCRSP Percentage change in number of  CRSP common shares outstanding.
dCDIVP Change in common dividend declared as percentage of book value of equity.
dDIVP Change in common plus preferred dividends declared, as a percentage of book
value of equity.
dQSUBDB Percentage change in sub debt as percentage of quarter-average total assets.
dBVEQ Change in book value of equity as a percentage of total assets.
TAGROW Quarter to quarter change in total assets divided by beginning of quarter total
assets.
“Factors affecting BHC leverage (dummy variables)”
DCDIVUP 1 if $ dividend increased from prior quarter, 0 otherwise.
DCOMUP 1 if increase in common outstanding, 0 otherwise.
DPFUP 1 if increase in preferred outstanding, 0 otherwise.
DEQUP 1 if increase in either type of equity, 0 otherwise.
DSND 1 if debentures rose in $ value, 0 otherwise.
"Factors affecting asset risk"
dSECPCT Change in securities portfolio as a proportion of total assets.
"Other Measures" of managerial action
dFTEMP Percentage change in number of full-time-equivalent employees.
dUINSINS Change in uninsured liabilities as a percentage of insured liabilities.
dUNINTA Change in uninsured liabilities as a proportion of total assets.35
Table 5: Exogenous variables
Variable
Name Variable Description
CASHTA BHC’s cash, divided by total assets.
CILNTA BHC’s commercial and industrial loans, divided by total
assets.
CPTA BHC’s commercial paper outstanding, divided by total
assets.
GLOANSTA BHC’s gross loans, divided by total assets.
TRADETA BHC’s  assets held in trading portfolio, divided by total
assets.
NINCTA BHC’s  net income, divided by total assets.
TOTLIATA BHC’s total liabilities, divided by total assets.
LNPDTA BHC’s  loans past due 90 days or more, divided by total
assets.
LNSNATA BHC’s  loans on non-accrual status, divided by total
assets.
CHRGOTA BHC’s loan chargeoffs, divided by total assets.
RECVRTA BHC’s  recoveries on loans previously charged off ,
divided by total assets.
LNTA BHC’s  natural log of total assets.
·  All BHC ratios are measured as changes, from one end-of-quarter to the next.
·   The “total assets” divisor is the quarterly average of total assets, not the quarter-end value. Except
·  Three quarterly lags (t-1, t-2, t-3) of all control variables are included in ‘influence’ equations (3).
·  Contemporaneous and three quarterly lags (t , t-1, t-2, t-3) of all control variables are included in ‘response’
equations (4).36
Notes for Table 6a and 6b: Summary results for ‘influence’ regressions.
·  Italicized coefficients are significant at the 10% level; bold denotes significance at the 5% level.
·  Reported coefficients are sums of the three lagged coefficients.  Influence regressions were run
separately for each action variable, using stock/bond directional dummies for past three quarters,
three lags of the dependent variable, three lags of the exogenous variables in Table 5, and a set of
“year” dummy variables. The “Adjusted R
2” statistic indicating goodness-of-fit for the probit
regressions is the likelihood ratio index (Greene [1993], page 651).
·  The numbers reported for “H0: All 8 sums = 0” are p-values.
Notes for Table 7a and 7b: ‘Influence’ and ‘response’ regression results and sign-based test of
beneficial/perverse influence.
·  Italicized coefficients are significant at the 10% level; bold denotes significance at the 5% level.
·  Influence regression results are repeated (in transposed form) from Tables 6a and 6b.  The numbers
reported are sums of the three coefficients on lagged stock/bond return measures.
·  Response equations (4a and 4b) were estimated separately for stock and bond returns.  For each
security return, we estimated separate regressions for the set of continuous and discrete action
variables. (Including both the OLS and the probit residuals in the same response equation yields very
similar results.)  Explanatory variables were the unexpected components of all action variables
(residuals from the Influence regressions), the lagged security return, year dummies, and the
contemporaneous and three lags of the exogenous variables from Table 5.
·  Beneficial/perverse influence tests were based on coefficient signs, without regard for significance
levels.  The classifications from Table 3 were applied to combinations of influence and response
equation coefficients. The sign of ‘b1’ implies which direction the action variable must move to
increase a security’s value. If all relevant stock/bond ‘a1’ coefficient signs were consistent with
beneficial influence, the result was classified as ’BB’.  If the majority of influence coefficients were
consistent with beneficial influence, the result was classified as ‘B’; if evenly divided, as ‘?’, etc.37
Table 6a: Summary results for ‘influence’ regressions (3a) using 2-way classification of returns as ‘down’ and ‘up’, multiplied by absolute
value of return.
OLS using continuous dependent action variables
CMINCR PFINCR EQINCR dSHCRSP dCDIVP dDDIVP dQSUBDB dBVEQ TAGROW
Sum 3 SuBu |R
stk| 0.00062 0.00021 0.00091 0.00035 -0.00004 -0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00019
Sum 3 SuBd |R
stk| 0.00198 0.00001 0.00215 0.00304 0.00013 0.00010 0.00001 0.00001 0.00010
Sum 3 SdBu |R
stk| 0.00073 -0.00014 0.00054 0.00051 -0.00050 -0.00046 0.00000 -0.00007 0.00025
Sum 3 SdBd |R
stk| 0.00116 -0.00003 0.00118 -0.00035 -0.00016 -0.00014 0.00002 -0.00015 0.00015
Sum 3 SuBu |R
bnd| 0.00006 0.00051 0.00067 0.00171 -0.00016 -0.00021 -0.00003 -0.00015 0.00021
Sum 3 SuBd |R
bnd| 0.00239 -0.00012 0.00255 0.00657 -0.00110 -0.00109 -0.00021 -0.00013 0.00013
Sum 3 SdBu |R
bnd| 0.00088 0.00051 0.00170 0.00378 -0.00021 -0.00020 -0.00003 0.00003 -0.00003
Sum 3 SdBd |R
bnd| 0.00135 -0.00024 0.00115 0.00421 -0.00079 -0.00083 -0.00005 0.00034 0.00075
H0: All return coefs = 0 0.0001 0.7225 0.0004 0.2975 0.0000 0.0000 0.2021 0.0181 0.0006
All variables 0.5843 0.3428 0.5370 0.1081 0.7671 0.7886 0.0626 0.3804 0.9826
w/o returns 0.5462 0.3377 0.5080 0.1074 0.7617 0.7841 0.0653 0.3702 0.9822








w/o shocks or years 0.5252 0.3145 0.4833 0.0036 0.7298 0.7528 0.0074 0.0412 0.0316
Nobs 2045 2032 2028 2043 2053 2049 2053 2053 2053
OLS using continuous dependent action variables Probit using binary dependent action variables
dSECPCT dFTEMP dUININS dUNINTA DCDIVUP DCOMUP DPFUP DEQUP DSND
Sum 3 SuBu |R
stk| -0.00013 0.00102 0.00002 -0.00005 0.01001 0.02711 0.01807 0.01728 0.00286
Sum 3 SuBd |R
stk| -0.00008 0.00036 0.00019 0.00006 -0.00417 0.01924 0.00267 0.01184 -0.02538
Sum 3 SdBu |R
stk| 0.00053 0.00023 -0.00084 -0.00039 -0.13247 -0.02192 0.00918 -0.00680 0.01424
Sum 3 SdBd |R
stk| -0.00028 0.00016 0.00059 0.00023 -0.05781 0.03606 0.04518 0.03299 0.01851
Sum 3 SuBu |R
bnd| 0.00058 0.00009 0.00028 0.00017 -0.18891 0.07786 -0.02001 0.07263 -0.11977
Sum 3 SuBd |R
bnd| 0.00123 0.00078 0.00459 0.00202 -0.28775 0.17336 -0.25008 0.06670 -0.07733
Sum 3 SdBu |R
bnd| -0.00020 -0.00098 0.00028 0.00043 -0.05021 0.16597 -0.08554 0.07705 -0.24919
Sum 3 SdBd |R
bnd| 0.00041 0.00003 -0.00376 -0.00162 -0.09991 0.04178 -0.16078 0.02792 -0.10480
H0: All return coefs = 0 0.7108 0.1891 0.0713 0.1045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0195 0.0009 0.0005
All variables 0.3034 0.6341 0.1521 0.1852 0.7404 0.5407 0.4969 0.4816 0.3139
w/o returns 0.3031 0.6338 0.1516 0.1831 0.6937 0.5151 0.4741 0.4642 0.2951








w/o shocks or years 0.1310 0.0112 0.0205 0.0281 0.2073 0.4723 0.3870 0.4123 0.2686
Nobs 2053 2053 1851 1856 2053 2045 2032 2029 205338
Table 6b: Summary results for ‘influence’ regressions (3b) using 3-way classification of returns as ‘down’, ‘flat’, and ‘up’.
OLS using continuous dependent action variables
CMINCR PFINCR EQINCR dSHCRSP dCDIVP dDDIVP dQSUBDB dBVEQ TAGROW
Sum 3 SuBu 0.0019 0.0054 0.0083 -0.0091 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0047
Sum 3 SuBf -0.0118 0.0010 -0.0116 0.0103 0.0038 0.0040 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0024
Sum 3 SuBd 0.0143 -0.0013 0.0141 0.0194 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0007
Sum 3 SfBu -0.0013 0.0035 0.0017 -0.0293 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001
Sum 3 SfBd 0.0063 0.0051 0.0102 -0.0409 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0004
Sum 3 SdBu -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0053 -0.0107 -0.0040 -0.0033 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0036
Sum 3 SdBf 0.0112 0.0052 0.0162 -0.0669 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0039
Sum 3 SdBd 0.0136 0.0039 0.0180 -0.0304 -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0042
H0: All return coefs = 0 0.0037 0.0593 0.0003 0.2695 0.0256 0.1538 0.4367 0.5975 0.0170
All variables 0.5523 0.3387 0.5153 0.1071 0.7617 0.7840 0.0630 0.3696 0.9823
w/o returns 0.5462 0.3377 0.5080 0.1074 0.7617 0.7841 0.0653 0.3702 0.9822








w/o shocks or years 0.4833 0.3106 0.4514 0.0124 0.7180 0.7416 0.0067 0.0247 0.0147
Nobs 2045 2032 2028 2043 2053 2049 2053 2053 2053
OLS using continuous dependent action variables Probit using binary dependent action variables
dSECPCT dFTEMP dUININS dUNINTA DCDIVUP DCOMUP DPFUP DEQUP DSND
Sum 3 SuBu -0.0059 0.0232 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0308 1.2913 0.2144 0.7876 -0.4960
Sum 3 SuBf -0.0034 0.0190 0.0150 0.0038 0.4883 0.7684 -0.2497 0.2488 -0.0286
Sum 3 SuBd -0.0030 0.0149 0.0230 0.0070 0.0554 0.8836 -0.6848 0.2761 -0.7379
Sum 3 SfBu -0.0001 0.0037 0.0130 0.0039 -0.1024 0.9687 0.0481 0.5929 -0.4904
Sum 3 SfBd 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0209 0.0083 0.0657 1.4587 -0.4863 0.5064 -0.2577
Sum 3 SdBu 0.0093 0.0144 0.0004 -0.0016 -1.1968 0.2956 -0.7983 -0.2177 -0.5376
Sum 3 SdBf -0.0045 0.0111 0.0015 0.0000 0.0750 1.3575 0.4237 0.7848 -0.0847
Sum 3 SdBd -0.0051 0.0088 0.0149 0.0044 -0.9633 1.4655 0.5190 0.8410 -0.1623
H0: All return coefs = 0 0.5559 0.0413 0.0496 0.0646 0.0002 0.0002 0.0041 0.0029 0.0506
All variables 0.3061 0.6367 0.1593 0.1905 0.7136 0.5484 0.4972 0.4854 0.3093
w/o returns 0.3031 0.6338 0.1516 0.1831 0.6937 0.5151 0.4741 0.4642 0.2951








w/o shocks or years 0.1344 0.0066 0.0259 0.0291 0.0914 0.4640 0.3801 0.4070 0.2642
Nobs 2053 2053 1851 1856 2053 2045 2032 2029 205339
Table 7a: ‘Influence’ and ‘response’ regression results and sign-based test of beneficial/perverse influence using 2-way classification of







Absolute value of stock return multiplies Absolute value of bond return multiplies Action
variables ¯  SuBu  SuBd  SdBu  SdBd  SuBu  SuBd  SdBu  SdBd
Stock Bonds Stock Bonds
Continuous action variables
CMINCR 0.0006 0.0020 0.0007 0.0012 0.0001 0.0024 0.0009 0.0014 13.975 -42.191 BB PP
PFINCR 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0002 -16.964 -44.674 P?
EQINCR 0.0009 0.0022 0.0005 0.0012 0.0007 0.0026 0.0017 0.0012 14.645 41.517 BB BB
dSHCRSP 0.0004 0.0030 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0066 0.0038 0.0042 3.582 0.068 BB B
dCDIVP 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0008 207.221 -161.162 ?B B
dDDIVP -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0008 -116.735 141.188 BP P
dQSUBDB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -129.724 -56.052 PP ?
dBVEQ 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 136.120 45.047 ??
TAGROW 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 -15.753 -3.711 PP PP
dSECPCT -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0004 19.708 6.775 PB
dFTEMP 0.0010 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0000 -6.234 -2.944 PP P
dUININS 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0006 0.0003 0.0046 0.0003 -0.0038 18.375 -4.308 BP
dUNINTA -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0020 0.0004 -0.0016 -70.996 -7.397 ?P
Binary action variables (1 if increase, 0 if decrease)
DCDIVUP 0.0100 -0.0042 -0.1325 -0.0578 -0.1889 -0.2878 -0.0502 -0.0999 2.145 0.111 PP P
DCOMUP 0.0271 0.0192 -0.0219 0.0361 0.0779 0.1734 0.1660 0.0418 1.478 0.182 BB B
DPFUP 0.0181 0.0027 0.0092 0.0452 -0.0200 -0.2501 -0.0855 -0.1608 0.258 0.204 BB PP
DEQUP 0.0173 0.0118 -0.0068 0.0330 0.0726 0.0667 0.0771 0.0279 -0.920 -0.055 PP P
DSND 0.0029 -0.0254 0.0142 0.0185 -0.1198 -0.0773 -0.2492 -0.1048 -0.284 -0.061 PB B40
Table 7b: ‘Influence’ and ‘response’ regression results and sign-based test of beneficial/perverse influence using 3-way classification of







variables ¯  SuBu  SuBf  SuBd  SfBu  SfBd  SdBu  SdBf  SdBd Stock Bonds Stock Bonds
Continuous Action Variables
CMINCR 0.0019 -0.0118 0.0143 -0.0013 0.0063 -0.0014 0.0112 0.0136 5.462 -3.758 B P
PFINCR 0.0054 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0035 0.0051 -0.0039 0.0052 0.0039 -40.373 -9.828 P P
EQINCR 0.0083 -0.0116 0.0141 0.0017 0.0102 -0.0053 0.0162 0.0180 35.558 5.519 B B
dSHCRSP -0.0091 0.0103 0.0194 -0.0293 -0.0409 -0.0107 -0.0669 -0.0304 4.529 0.028 P P
dCDIVP -0.0004 0.0038 0.0009 0.0013 0.0004 -0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0025 124.920 38.052 P ?
dDDIVP 0.0000 0.0040 0.0011 0.0017 0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0019 -17.072 -68.724 ? P
dQSUBDB -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -160.207 -89.684 BB BB
dBVEQ 0.0011 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 128.711 78.941 B B
TAGROW 0.0047 0.0024 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0036 0.0039 0.0042 9.102 18.495 BB B
dSECPCT -0.0059 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0093 -0.0045 -0.0051 13.075 7.778 P P
dFTEMP 0.0232 0.0190 0.0149 0.0037 -0.0004 0.0144 0.0111 0.0088 -5.451 -5.222 PP P
dUININS 0.0027 0.0150 0.0230 0.0130 0.0209 0.0004 0.0015 0.0149 23.194 -8.080 BB PP
dUNINTA -0.0026 0.0038 0.0070 0.0039 0.0083 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0044 -76.657 -3.221 P P
Binary action variables (1 if increase, 0 if decrease)
DCDIVUP -0.0308 0.4883 0.0554 -0.1024 0.0657 -1.1968 0.0750 -0.9633 1.648 -0.101 ? B
DCOMUP 1.2913 0.7684 0.8836 0.9687 1.4587 0.2956 1.3575 1.4655 0.933 -0.313 BB PP
DPFUP 0.2144 -0.2497 -0.6848 0.0481 -0.4863 -0.7983 0.4237 0.5190 -0.718 -0.423 ? ?
DEQUP 0.7876 0.2488 0.2761 0.5929 0.5064 -0.2177 0.7848 0.8410 -0.216 0.631 P B
DSND -0.4960 -0.0286 -0.7379 -0.4904 -0.2577 -0.5376 -0.0847 -0.1623 -0.362 -0.131 BB BB41































































































































                                                          
1 The other two pillars are minimum capital standards and supervisory review of capital adequacy.
2  Just as “market discipline” is frequently used without sufficient refinement, so too do academics
also tend to use the term “monitoring” in various senses.  Diamond’s [1984] path-breaking paper
on “delegated monitoring” requires that the lender make advance arrangements to assess what
actually happens to a borrower’s cash flows.  Other writers envision monitoring as an ongoing
process by which a lender deters manager/owners from transferring wealth from the debt holders
to themselves, usually through monitoring and enforcement of ex ante negotiated covenants that
restrict managerial discretion.  Williamson [1986] models monitoring as an ex post activity: given
default, bank pays to audit and uncover fraud.
3 See the recent survey by Flannery [1998], and earlier papers by Gilbert [1990] and Berger
[1991].
4Another impediment to market discipline is sometimes a legal environment that makes
stockholder activism and hostile takeovers difficult. The recent failures of a number of hostile
takeover attempts in France and Germany, with the active participation of governments on the side
of target management, are examples.
5 Markets, other than the securities markets considered in this paper and in recent regulatory
proposals, also influence managers. These include the market for corporate control (takeovers), the
managerial labor market (turnover) and the direct influence exerted by large stockholders. See
Shleifer and Vishny [1997]) for a review of the relevant theory and evidence.
6 Prowse [1997] concludes that government supervisors are more likely than investors to impose
extreme discipline (such as managerial turnover or forced mergers) for banking firms.  To the
extent that institutional arrangements have reduced investors’ incentives to monitor and influence,
our study will be biased toward finding no effective market influence.44
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 The impact of a debt overhang on shareholders’ investment incentives is one exception to this
statement. Again, this is an extreme circumstance.
8 Treating each outstanding bond for a given BHC separately, matching each bond with repeated s-
tock and BHC variables, would have given undue weight to bank holding companies with a large
number of bonds outstanding.
9 If x is the percentage of stock up (S
u) moves and y is the percentage of bond up (B
u) moves, then






10 1998 data were omitted from the Figures because the Warga-Lehman Brothers database ends in
March of that year.
11 Our methodology for seeking what we call “influence” is tied to observed managerial actions.
Allen Berger has pointed out that influence can also result in managers deciding not to take certain
actions, for example not undertaking certain risky types of investments because the bondholders
would be harmed and this would subsequently drive up the firm’s cost of capital. Such “absence of
action” cannot be measured, so we cannot conclude whether or not this ‘anticipatory influence’
exists. However, if influence is apparent in the observed managerial actions, it may provide some
support for the belief that unobserved anticipatory influence also obtains.
12 The structure of our model assumes that manager’s response to shocks in one period cannot be
completed in the same period. In our empirical implementation this means that managers cannot
offset, in the same quarter, exogenous shocks that we observe as changes in the firm balance sheet
over the same quarter.
13 Another implication of rational expectations is that returns will be serially uncorrelated, even if
market influence (discipline) obtains.
14 We assume that neither the manager nor the stockholder can predict future exogenous shocks.45
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 We investigated whether the results we present here depend on the particular return variables
used.  They do not.  We therefore used the simple stock excess return—the return relative to the
value-weighted stock market index—and the within-BHC value-weighted bond excess return
measured relative to the value-weighted index using S&P credit classifications.
16 Our use of bond returns as one measure of BHC value necessarily assumes that subordinated
debenture holders felt exposed to default risks.  While there is some question whether this was true
for most of the 1980’s, by the end of that decade BHC debenture rates clearly reflected cross-
sectional variations in default probabilities (Flannery and Sorescu [1996], DeYoung et al.
[1999a]).
17 For binary action measures, we estimate (3a) or (3b) as a probit, and report the likelihood ratio
index (Greene [1993], page 651) as a goodness-of-fit statistic.